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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of contract law concerns how to treat instances in which one
party is vulnerable to advantage-taking by another. The cases fall into
two groups. In some, the advantage taker just happens upon the vul-
nerable party and has no part in creating that vulnerability. This has
been labeled “pure advantage-taking.”1 In other cases, specifically du-
ress and undue influence, the advantage taker is responsible to some
degree for creating that vulnerability. This is “active advantage-tak-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Huber C. Hurst Eminent Scholar, University of Florida College of Law.
1. Rick Bigwood, Contracts by Unfair Advantage: From Exploitation to Transac-
tional Neglect, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (2005).
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ing.”2 In all cases, contract law takes a permissive approach by limit-
ing the remedy to avoidance and restitution.3 This Article argues that
the permissive approach is inappropriate, particularly in cases in
which the vulnerability is created.4 Its position is that these are cases
of cognitive trespass that should be treated as torts, thus leading to
the availability of punitive damages. The analysis breaks with the tra-
dition of viewing duress and undue influence through the lenses of
free will,5 impairment of bargaining power,6 or the fairness of the bar-
gain.7 Instead, it argues that illegitimate pressure alone is a harm
that should be addressed regardless of the contractual outcome.
The approach currently taken is labeled “permissive” for two rea-
sons. First, even when a contract is successfully avoided, the parties
are returned, as much as possible, to their ex ante positions.8 This
means there is little incentive not to take maximum advantage of vul-
nerable parties, even if it means investing in creating that vulnerabil-
ity. This is particularly obvious in the case of repeat players. For
example, take the case of an auto dealer that makes a habit of pres-
suring elderly or uneducated customers. Even if a handful of those
contracts are avoided by customers, the net expected gain to the
dealer is positive unless every disadvantaged party brings an action or
the activity is penalized. The idea that every contract made under sus-
pect conditions would be challenged is, if course, unsupportable. Peo-
ple who are vulnerable in the context of contract-making are probably
less likely to assert a legal action in the first place or are simply igno-
rant of their rights. Moreover, to the extent the vulnerable party is
also less affluent, such an action involves a substantial risk. The re-
peat advantage taker has an expected net positive outcome from exer-
cising not just maximum leverage, but from actually making improper
2. Perhaps a more apt label would be “impure advantage-taking” since the advan-
tage taker is fully aware of the nature of his or her effort. “Active,” though, also
captures what is happening.
3. See infra notes 8–20 and accompanying text.
4. This is not to say there are not sound arguments for a more aggressive approach
in all cases of knowing advantage-taking. See Bigwood, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 357–59
(1915). See generally M.H. Ogilvie, Wrongfulness, Rights and Economic Duress,
16 OTTAWA L. REV. 1 (1984); M.H. Ogilvie, Economic Duress in Contract: Depar-
ture, Detour or Dead End?, 34 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 194 (2000); Note, Economic
Duress After the Demise of Free Will Theory, 53 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1968). As Dan
Dobbs notes, “[N]o satisfactory means of gauging free will has been found.” DAN
B. DOBBS, 2 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 655 (2d ed.
1993).
6. John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV.
253, 266–67 (1947); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943); see Hamish Stewart, A Formal Approach to Contrac-
tual Duress, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 175, 241 (1997).
7. Dawson, supra note 6, at 287.
8. Avoidance is typically accompanied by restitution, if possible.
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threats like those enumerated in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts.9 More worrisome is that this net positive outcome encourages
research and investment in activities designed to create duress and
undue influence.10
Even for the non-repeat player the net expected outcome is likely
to be positive. The likelihood the disadvantaged party will bring an
action is far less than 100%. Thus, the probabilities favor keeping the
profits from the exchange. And even if avoided, the result is loss of
those ill-gotten gains without further consequence. Consequently, for
the advantage taker, it is a bit like gambling, except your money is
returned if you lose.
The second manifestation of the permissiveness of the current ap-
proach is that the remedy of avoidance only extends to those who were
unable to resist the pressure exerted. Oftentimes the party upon
whom pressure is applied does resist and no contract is made, or one is
made on fair terms. If fact, he or she may not want to avoid the con-
tract because it ultimately reflects a fair outcome as a result of re-
sisting illegitimate pressure. Under these circumstances, even an
acceptable bargain is achieved at an unnecessary cost.
Studies of brain circuitry indicate that threat-making and the re-
sulting stress activate a series of chemical reactions that are physi-
cally harmful to the disadvantaged party.11 If one is said to own
oneself and the processes that take place in one’s brain, the threat-
maker or one creating undue influence is an unwanted intruder re-
gardless of whether the target is able to resist. There is no logical rea-
son why intrusion is viewed as any less physical than more
conventional intrusions on private property. In fact, it is noteworthy
that the origins of actions based on duress were in the context of
9. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
(1) A threat is improper if
(a) what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat itself would
be a crime or a tort if it resulted in obtaining property,
(b) what is threatened is a criminal prosecution,
(c) what is threatened is the use of civil process and the threat is
made in bad faith, or
(d) the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
under a contract with the recipient.
(2) A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms,
and
(a) the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not signif-
icantly benefit the party making the threat,
(b) the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the manifestation of
assent is significantly increased by prior unfair dealing by the party
making the threat, or
(c) what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for illegitimate
ends.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
10. Perhaps the only factor offsetting this is a risk of reputational harm.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 66–79.
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“physical assault, exerted or threatened, by means of which transfer[s]
. . . were extorted.”12
Contract law’s policy of effectively incentivizing engagement in du-
ress and undue influence is unsupportable as an economic and philo-
sophical manner. Deterrence is the appropriate policy, but contract
law has no teeth in this regard. Deterrence calls for punitive damages
and can be drawn from tort law. The proposed solution is that duress
and undue influence be regarded as torts with the desired conse-
quences that (1) parties who are taken advantage of are more likely to
bring vindicating actions in part because legal assistance will be more
readily available, and (2) those who do take advantage will have nega-
tive expected outcomes. Treating duress and undue influence as torts
is not much of a leap for two reasons. First, the fact that parties al-
ready have a right avoid contracts made under conditions of duress or
undue influence suggests very strongly that there already is a soft
duty not to engage in these activities. Second, the test of whether a
duty has been violated is whether one party has forced another to
enter into a contract that a court now finds voidable.13 In other words,
no additional judicial analysis is necessary to determine if the duty
has been violated.
Part II explains why this effort is limited to instances of duress and
undue influence and why they are joined together. Part III addresses
why the current posture of the law with respect to advantage-taking
cannot be justified by economics or moral philosophy. It analogizes du-
ress and undue influence to instances of theft in the sense that they
involve the taking of another’s capacity. Part IV compares informa-
tion, offers, and threats. Part V is a brief summary of the scientific
literature supporting the view that placing people in stressful situa-
tions is a physical intrusion. Part VI is a survey of the scattered but
useful literature with respect to treating active advantage-taking as a
tort. Part VII examines the law as it applies to viewing duress and
undue influence as torts. It notes that some courts appear to treat du-
ress as a tort. An exhaustive search, however, did not find any cases in
which undue influence, in the contract law context, was treated as a
tort. Part VIII contains concluding remarks focusing on the problems
of adopting the approach advanced here.
Before beginning, a quick qualification is in order. Although the
theme of this Article is that contract law actually condones advantage-
taking by limiting remedies for the vulnerable to avoidance of the con-
tract, it does not take issue with the classes of vulnerability as identi-
fied in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The basic categories in
12. Dawson, supra note 6, at 254.
13. This does not, however, provide a remedy for those who successfully resist coer-
cive efforts. It is likely, though, that taking a punitive approach to overreaching,
as proposed here, would decrease the instances in which resistance is necessary.
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the Restatement seem correct. In that context, vulnerability involves
being susceptible to harm by reason of capacity,14 duress,15 undue in-
fluence,16 or material misrepresentation.17 Because unconscionability
seems to take on both a procedural and a substantive element,18 it too
can be treated as a case of vulnerability; but that possibility is not
explored here because the advantage-taking party is not always the
source of the weaker party’s disability.19 Finally, vulnerability, as
treated here, does not involve instances in which one party simply has
better information than another.
II. PURE AND ACTIVE ADVANTAGE-TAKING
This Article addresses active, as opposed to pure, advantage-tak-
ing. An explanation for focusing on discouraging active advantage-
taking is in order because there also may be very sound reasons to
discourage pure advantage-taking. Good examples of pure advantage-
taking are instances in which a contracting party is volitionally or cog-
nitively impaired. The law presumes impairment in cases of minors.
In the case of pure advantage-taking, the advantage taker may or may
not be ignorant of his or her counterpart’s weakness. In instances in
which the advantaged party does not know about the other party’s
weakness or has no reason to know, punishment is not likely to
change behavior or it may change it in unwelcome ways. Specifically,
assigning liability in these instances could lead to intrusion into all
parties’ statuses. In each instance, the potential advantage taker
would be motivated to delve into the personal characteristics of each
contracting party. In this regard, it is useful to distinguish minors
from adults who are impaired. It is probably not intrusive to ask for
proof of age from a minor. Examining an adult’s mental health before
contracting with him, on the other hand, seems unduly intrusive.
When the advantage taker knows or should know of vulnerability,
punishment may be appropriate, just as in the case of active advan-
tage-taking. This is a closer call than when the advantage taker has
no reason to know. After all, as in the case of active advantage-taking,
the quality of consent falls below that necessary to guarantee that
both parties benefit as a result of the contract. However, there is a
problem. The advantage taker may know or should know about the
cognitive limitations of the contracting partner. This does not mean
the party will know the weakness is so severe and continuing that the
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12–16 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174–75 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
19. See Rick Bigwood, Undue Influence, ‘Impaired Consent,’ or ‘Wicked Exploitation’?,
16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 514 (1996).
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weaker party cannot make a rational, self-interested choice. A general
rule, backed up by punitive damages, that one must not contract with
those who are impaired might work to harm the impaired by imping-
ing on their autonomy.
Minors exemplify this point. Age itself is not a reliable indication of
minors’ abilities to act in their self-interest. So too, the cognitively im-
paired may be able to make well-informed decisions. Almost certainly,
a more nuanced approach than the one proposed here for active ad-
vantage-taking is warranted. Perhaps some version of a duty to care
leading to a negligence standard is appropriate.20 In any case, the
treatment of instances in which the contracting party knows of the
impairment but has no part in creating it certainly deserves more at-
tention in the form of further research. It does appear, though, that
this version of possible advantage-taking can be distinguished in a
principled way from instances in which the advantage taker has es-
sentially set a trap for the contracting partner.
This may lead to the question of why duress and undue influence
are treated together in this effort. Duress requires a specific threat
that leaves no reasonable alternative.21 Undue influence, on the other
hand, suggests a more general dominance over someone in a weak-
ened state and use of that dominance to “force” the disadvantaged
party into contracts on terms to which they would not otherwise
agree.22 In both cases, the advantage-taking party actually intrudes
on the thinking of the victim. It is true that the party who is unduly
influenced may already be in a weakened state, but without the domi-
nance of the advantage taker and its use, the decision making would
be different.23
One might also ask why fraud and misrepresentation are not in-
cluded in this analysis. Neither involve an actual intrusion into the
reasoning process. Both are akin to providing incorrect data but, ar-
guably, they do not cause an impairment. Both effectively cause the
contracting party to make a mistake because of that data. Plus, in the
case of fraud, a tort remedy is already available.24
20. See Bigwood, supra note 1.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
22. Undue influence is “unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of
the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation between
them is justified in assuming that that person will not act in a manner inconsis-
tent with his welfare.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981).
23. See, e.g., Odorrizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 543 (Cal. App.
1966); Neill v. Brackett, 126 N.E. 93, 94 (Mass. 1920); Howe v. Palmer, 956
N.E.2d 249, 254 (Mass. App. 2011).
24. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 325–26 (4th
ed. 1998).
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This Article treats duress and “economic duress” alike. Duress ini-
tially involved physical harm or threats to do physical harm.25 Eco-
nomic duress is the term used to distinguish other types of threats
from physical threats.26 Initially the term referred to duress of goods,
refusals to provide service, and threats of physical prosecution.27 It is
this Article’s position that there is no meaningful distinction between
physical duress and economic duress.28 Ultimately, putting someone
under duress or applying duress, whether physically or economically,
has a physical impact. Therefore, physical threats and so-called eco-
nomic threats should be treated alike.
Tort law already includes an action based on intentional infliction
of emotional distress.29 Why not simply argue that it should be ex-
panded to include the distress caused by duress and undue influence?
People under duress or subject to undue influence are injured, but in
many cases these injuries are temporary. If the tort of infliction of
emotional distress was expanded to include all injuries of that na-
ture—not just those in the context of contracts—it would be difficult
to contain and would likely trivialize a cause of action that is already
subject to multiple uncertainties.30 Specifically, a general expansion
of what it means to intentionally inflict emotional distress would open
the door to claims having nothing to do with contracts and based on
simple day-to-day difficulties. In addition, it is not clear that the peo-
ple who act aggressively in the contracts context possess the necessary
intent to cause harm.31 Perhaps those actually harming others in the
context of contracts could be regarded as negligent. However, courts
have generally required the distress to be severe before finding that
emotional distress has been negligently caused.32 Most importantly,
in the case of duress and undue influence it is unnecessary to become
entangled in the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. A
contract will be avoidable or not. If it is avoidable on one of these ba-
ses, no further analysis is necessary.
This means some injuries will not be addressed. As noted in Part I,
some people, despite coercive efforts, do resist. For instance, in the
high-pressure car salesperson example, perhaps the consumer does
not give in and buy the car. Or perhaps the consumer buys a car on
much better terms than first offered. The psychic cost of resisting
these efforts is a form of injury. Ideally, the people who are happy with
25. Dawson, supra note 6, at 254.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 255–56.
28. See Ogilvie, Wrongfulness, Rights and Economic Duress, supra note 5, at 33.
29. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 821–52 (2000).
30. Id. at 823–24.
31. They do, however, possess the necessary intent to place someone under duress or
apply undue influence.
32. DOBBS, supra note 29, at 835–39.
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the outcome but had to undergo illegitimate pressures would be
among those who could recover. If so, the area of protection proposed
here could be extended to all contracts that are voidable due to duress
or undue influence and all those that would have been made if the
subject of those pressures had given in. A choice was made not to in-
clude the latter group. First, as a matter of practicality, assessing the
ability to avoid unmade contracts is likely impossible. Second, if tort
remedies are available when actual contracts are made under condi-
tions of undue influence or duress, it seems very likely that there
would be a disincentive to apply those pressures at all, meaning con-
cerns about the hypothetically avoidable contract become less
pressing.
III. ARE THERE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PERMISSIVE
APPROACH?
A. The Economics
1. Efficiency and Investment in Advantage-Taking Strategies
i. A Paretian Standard
Most people value making good deals, regardless of whether they
generally benefit society. To understand why contracts made under
conditions of duress or undue influence are never good deals from a
social standpoint, think about the costs associated with options availa-
ble to the party who is vulnerable and enters into a contract, whether
it is a case of pure or active advantage-taking. That party may do
nothing and, in effect, ratify the transaction. The vulnerable party can
refuse to perform and use one of several arguments for avoiding the
contract, or may ask for a declaratory judgement. The last two options
are costly and risky to a party who may already be at a disadvantage
vis-a`-vis the other contracting party. In many instances, the contracts
formed by those who are vulnerable are carried forth and performed
because of ignorance of the law, risk aversion, or financial reasons.
What then is the character of those deals that are left undisturbed?
There are two possibilities. One is that the vulnerable party is actu-
ally worse off after the contract than before. The other is that the vul-
nerable party is better off after making the contract. Take the easy
case first. Your elderly uncle is no longer fully able to understand all
the things he needs to ask about a car and is pressured to buy a car.
The salesperson makes a great deal, having sold a clunker for which
he paid $2,000 to your uncle for $5,000. Your uncle, on the other hand,
has paid $5,000 for car that only runs for a week or so and has a resale
value of $2,000. From a Pareto efficiency point of view,33 this cannot
33. Under Pareto standards of efficiency, a change is viewed as efficient or Pareto-
superior if at least one person is better off and no one is worse off. Changes that
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be regarded as beneficial to society, yet contract law is structured to
condone similar bargains unless one believes that every instance of
high pressure sales tactics applied to a vulnerable party is addressed
by the ability to avoid the contract. The fact that both parties are not
better off is just one cost. The other cost is the investment advantage
takers make in developing new ways to target various vulnerable
groups. This cost is a loss to society. It produces nothing—it just real-
locates what exists.
A harder case occurs when both parties are better off. Your uncle is
again pressured to buy a car, but this time the fair market value of the
car is $5,000. Your uncle is not worse off; he has swapped $5,000 for a
car worth $5,000. On the other hand, had he fully understood his op-
tions and not been pressured, he could have negotiated a better deal.
Perhaps he would have bought another car or talked the salesperson
into selling the car for $4,500. Here, although both parties are pre-
sumably better off, there are two costs. One is in the form of the oppor-
tunities your uncle lost. They were effectively “taken” by the
salesperson. The second may be more serious from a social standpoint.
Again, as long as the sales tactic is a “winner” there will be invest-
ment in developing it. From an economic point of view, this invest-
ment does not create anything—it merely has a distributive effect.
Society is actually worse off.
ii. Kaldor-Hicks and Selling Your Will
The rise of the economic analysis of law led to the use of wealth
maximization, or Kaldor-Hicks measures of efficiency, as a substitute
for Pareto efficiency.34 The theory is that involuntary transfers are
efficient if those gaining could compensate those who lose. The notion
has been repeatedly criticized as being inconsistent with any gener-
ally accepted goals.35 More to the point, it is useful, if at all, when
leave one or more parties worse off are Pareto-inferior. A Pareto-optimal alloca-
tion is one from which there can be no changes without making someone worse
off. See also Jeffrey L. Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the
Obligations of Legal Theory, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1997) (examining the distributive
consequences of the psychological and social factors that influence agreements).
See THOMAS F. COTTER & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS 45–46 (3d
ed. 2013).
34. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88–115 (1981); see also Rich-
ard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency Norms in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) (distinguishing the Kaldor-
Hicks measure of efficiency from the Pareto-superiority measure of efficiency);
Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979) (arguing wealth maximization serves as a firmer basis for a
normative theory of law compared to utilitarianism).
35. Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 509 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative
Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980).
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exchanges cannot occur because of high transaction costs.36 In the in-
stance of vulnerable people, transaction costs are not a problem. The
real problem is illustrated by considering that there are two transac-
tions. One is the obvious situation in which there is an exchange. To
understand the second one, take a fairly well-known case of undue
influence, Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District.37 Odorizzi was es-
sentially badgered into resigning from a teaching position because he
was a homosexual.38 He was in a weakened state when this oc-
curred.39 To determine whether the advantage-taking was wealth
maximizing, one would have to imagine Odorizzi before he was
badgered and before any threats were made. At that point he would be
asked how much he would take to sell his capacity. In other words,
what would it take to get him to consent to being placed in a position
in which he could not say no? Although it is technically an empirical
question, it seems unlikely that many people would sell their free will.
In fact, the price the Odorizzis of the world would ultimately charge
for, in this case, their resignation would have to be the summation of
what they would charge for their autonomy plus what they would
charge for the resignation if in a weakened state.40 Those desiring his
resignation would have to be willing to pay more.
iii. Advantage-Taking as Theft
The thesis of this Article is that duress and undue influence are
comparable to trespass; they are unwelcome intrusions into peoples’
property-like right to think for themselves. As an economic matter,
advantage-taking can also be viewed as a type of theft in the sense
that it is taking without permission. First, it is important to recognize
36. When transaction costs are low, it is not necessary to engage in the largely theo-
retical question of whether those made better off could compensate those made
worse off. The parties can do that directly.
37. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123 (1966).
38. Id. at 537–38.
39. Id.
40. Although this Article concerns only cases in which the advantage-taking party is
responsible for the weakness of the other party, some of the argument’s logic can
be carried over to cases of pure advantage-taking. In these instances, the advan-
tage-taking party is not in a position to “sell” or “buy” the weakened party’s ca-
pacity. For example, in Knoll v. Merrill Corp. an employee made a claim of wrong
discharge and then signed a release. See Knoll v. Merrill Corp., 2003 WL
22682271, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). He later complained that he lacked capacity but
not as a result of the employer’s actions. One could argue that the outcome was
wealth-maximizing as long as the employer came out ahead by more than em-
ployee was made worse off. In this case, one could view the employer as owning
the right to take advantage of the weakened party’s capacity. The problem is
that, although not “owned” by the weakened party, capacity has some value and
he might be willing to pay more to retain that capacity than the least the em-
ployer was willing to take. If so, it is hard to see this transaction as wealth-
maximizing.
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why we punish those who steal. Suppose you see a car you really like
but are unable to locate the owner right away. You look up the fair
market value of the car and, instead of obtaining the owner’s permis-
sion, you simply take the car and leave behind a sack of money con-
taining cash equal to the market value. Arguably this is efficient
because you now have the car and the owner has cash equal to its
value. The problem is that we do not know if the owner would have
sold the car at fair market value. In fact, if she would not have, you
have made the car owner worse off. The only way to ensure that the
exchange enhances social welfare (i.e., both parties are better off) is
for a voluntary transaction to take place. Plus, in this case, transac-
tion costs are likely to be low and a face-to-face transaction would be
relatively easy. At the most basic level, we punish theft because we do
not want one party making decisions that potentially misallocate re-
sources even from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective. In the case of vulnera-
ble people, the same is true. The advantage taker, like the thief, is
effectively making a decision for both parties because, by definition,
one of the parties is in a weakened state.41
iv. The Opportunistic Avoidance Issue
There is a more-or-less open economic question stemming from the
proposal of this practice. First, think of the making of a contract as a
“positive.” A true positive exists when a deal is struck that increases
the welfare of both parties without increasing investments in advan-
tage-taking. A false positive occurs when parties agree, but one is vul-
nerable and actually made worse off or denied better off opportunities
and investment in creating duress or undue influence is encouraged.42
As noted, today’s contract law encourages exactly these types of in-
vestments because the remedy of avoidance only makes them rela-
tively risk free.
Too permissive an approach to allowing parties to avoid contracts,
including incentivizing avoidance by adopting the tort approach of-
fered here, means that some contracts that were true positives may be
undone by opportunistic parties who simply have a change of heart. In
effect, they will seek to portray true positives as false positives. This
leads to a trade-off of two costs: limiting investments in advantage-
taking strategies while also discouraging opportunistic avoidance. The
current approach leads to the former and the tort approach arguably
41. The theft analogy is useful to understand why even pure and impure advantage-
taking should be treated alike. The pure advantage taker finds the vulnerable
person just as the thief might reach through an open window to take something
valuable. The impure advantage taker pries the window open in order to reach
what is valuable. In criminal law we have different terms for these offenses but
both are punishable, just as they should be in the context of contract formation.
42. “Worse off” here means both immediately and prospectively.
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could give rise to the latter. Which cost approach is lower is an empiri-
cal question, but it seems likely that opportunistic avoidance would be
relative rare. Many of those who engage in duress or undue influence,
like the high-pressure salesperson described here, are repeat players.
Successful efforts to enter into false positives can be part of an overall
strategy in which the investment leads to multiple profitable transac-
tions. On the other hand, individuals may find it profitable to repeat-
edly claim they were subject to duress or undue influence. It seems
unlikely, though, that claims of being repeatedly duped by several dif-
ferent merchants would be attractive given litigation costs and the
possibility that punitive damages might be unavailable to known re-
peat complainants.
B. Philosophical Questions
If there are no economic justifications for the current permissive
approach to advantage-taking, might there be support in the realm of
moral philosophy? Although this Article cannot survey such a broad
field, Kantian values, utilitarian goals, and a Rawlsian approach do
not provide that support. The basic Kantian idea is that if all men of
are of equal moral worth, then it is irrational to favor oneself over
others.43 More succinctly, people should not use others as a means to
an end. In many ways, contract law seems to embrace this view super-
ficially. Contract law has a long list of instances in which one party
may not advance his or her own goals by taking advantage of others.44
The problem, though, is with the remedy and the reality of how often
instances of advantage-taking are addressed. Currently, contract law
in the cases of duress and undue influence actually makes using an-
other to achieve one’s own ends attractive. Indeed, as noted in Part I,
it provides an incentive for these undertakings.
From the standpoint of utilitarianism, there is also is no basis for
permitting advantage-taking of those who are vulnerable. The central
problem with utilitarianism is that we simply do not and cannot know
what maximizes utility, although we can probably make reliable
guesses. For example, if it were possible to create a situation in which
Bill Gates is held up by a pauper who demands $20, it is likely that
the utility gains to the pauper would outstrip the loss to Bill Gates. In
the current context, though, we would have to be able to conclude that
advantage takers enjoy more utility by their actions than the level of
disutility suffered by their victims. In our earlier example, the advan-
43. See also Alan H. Goldman, Rights, Utilities, and Contracts, 3 CANADIAN J. PHIL.
121 (Supp. 1977); Mark Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Polit-
ical Questions Are Not All Economic, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1283 (1981). See JEFFRIE G.
MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 75 (1970).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12–15, 175, 177, 208 (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
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tage-taking car salesperson would be overjoyed and your uncle would
be only mildly annoyed. Nevertheless, as a general matter, we cannot
make interpersonal comparisons of utility. Therefore, utilitarianism
cannot provide any direction. As already noted, the law and economics
version of utilitarianism—wealth maximization—leads to indetermi-
nate outcomes and, for that and other reasons, cannot be squared with
Kantian or utilitarian goals.
A third alternative is to consider a Rawlsian outcome. Rawls
imagines rational people behind the “veil of ignorance.”45 Behind that
veil they cannot know what position they will hold in society.46 For
example, they will not know if they will be rich or poor, highly intelli-
gent, or able bodied. Behind the veil they make rules that will be ap-
plied when out from behind the veil.47 Everyone has an equal
probability of being gifted or not and, for purposes of this Article, they
will not know how or when their vulnerability might arise. They can-
not know what their position will be in society. Behind the veil, ac-
cording to Rawls, decision makers are likely to adopt his famous
difference principle: “social and economic inequalities are to be ar-
ranged so they are both (a) reasonably expected to be everyone’s ad-
vantage . . . and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”48
More specifically for the issues at hand, one should ask, “What would
contract law rules look like behind the veil?” Given that one would not
know if one was more or less vulnerable, the outcome would be to pro-
tect the vulnerable.49 Interestingly, contract law appears to do this.
However, the problem indicated throughout this Article is that con-
tract law expresses the right values but does not enforce them. In a
Rawlsian world, it is likely that exploitation of those who are vulnera-
ble would be unacceptable, as opposed to unacceptable only
sometimes.
IV. INFORMATION, OFFERS, AND THREATS
There is a distinction between fraud and misrepresentation on one
hand and duress and undue influence on the other. Fraud and misrep-
resentation are versions of incorrect data that may lead even a
smoothly functioning mind to make a mistake. It is also possible to see
threats as a form of information that may actually be true. “Your
money or your life” may be truthful. The difference is that “your
money or your life” is not harmful because it may lead to a mistaken
decision. It is harmful because simply hearing the information itself is
harmful. Duress, regardless of one’s ability to resist, is unwelcome.
45. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–41 (1971).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 60.
49. Here Rawls makes the assumption that people are largely risk averse.
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Legal philosophers have spent a great deal of effort defining the
essence of duress. Alan Wertheimer undertook one of the more pains-
taking efforts in Coercion.50 According to Wertheimer, “A coerces B to
do X if and only if (1) A’s proposal creates a choice situation for B such
that B has no reasonable alternative but to do X and (2) it is wrong for
A to make such a proposal to B.”51 This is effectively a two- pronged
test and is captured by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175.52
Wertheimer refers to the first step as the choice prong and the second
as the proposal prong.53 Both prongs are necessary. Under this stan-
dard, even an unwelcome choice proposed by someone who has every
right to present that choice is not applying duress.
Professor Rick Bigwood suggests the order of inquiry should be re-
versed from that offered by Werthimer: without an improper threat, it
is unnecessary to examine the existence of a reasonable alternative.54
Bigwood’s approach is a more useful way to view the issue for the pur-
poses of the arguments made here. This is because it is the threat, as
opposed to the choice, that is of primary importance in intruding on
one’s right to his or her own thinking process. In any case, the hard
decision is what it means to make a wrongful threat. Here again the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides a list.55 The relatively
simple part is that the threat is illegitimate if it is unlawful. The prob-
lem is creating boundaries around threats that although not techni-
cally unlawful are sufficiently, to use the Restatement’s terminology,
“improper.”56
The Restatement deals with this problem by dividing improper
threats into two categories based on the intrusiveness of the threats.
First, in the most intrusive cases, the contract can be avoided regard-
less of the fairness of the terms. In the second category, avoidance is
only permitted if the outcome of the bargain is unfair. Included in the
50. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987).
51. Id. at 172 (emphasis in the original).
52. The Restatement provides:
(1) If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat
by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the
contract is voidable by the victim.
(2) If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by one who is not a
party to the transaction, the contract is voidable by the victim unless the
other party to the transaction in good faith and without reason to know
of the duress either gives value or relies materially on the transaction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
53. WERTHEIMER, supra note 50, at 172.
54. Rick Bigwood, Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress, 46 U.
TORONTO L.J. 201, 213–14 (1996).
55. See supra note 9.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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second category are instances of spiteful acts57 or threats that are
compelling because of some prior unfair dealing.58 The problem is that
every contract involves a threat not to provide an outcome that one
party prefers. For example, a late arrival at an airport may find only
one cab available that charges far more than the traveler would like to
pay. Nevertheless, the traveler hires the cab because there is no rea-
sonable alternative. Of course, this begs the question of what it means
for an alternative to be reasonable or not. For example, consider “Pay
me $30,000 or you cannot have the title to this car,” or “Pay me $50 or
you may not golf on this course.” To a person who greatly desires the
car or to the avid golfer, there is only one reasonable choice. In effect,
the no reasonable alternative prong does not get us very far in identi-
fying isolated improper intrusions. Every contract involves a choice of
options and in many, if not most of them, one party will seem to have
more leverage.
What it means to trespass or to take one’s autonomy requires dis-
tinguishing between threats and offers.59 Consider these three
possibilities:
(1) I will not sell this boat to you unless you give me $30,000.
(2) I will not deliver the goods I promised unless you pay me an
additional $30,000.
(3) Resign your position as a teacher or I will report your misdeeds
to the newspapers.
In the case of the boat, the speaker creates an opportunity for the
offeree to increase her utility and provides information about how to
do that. The second and third examples involve choices between main-
taining the status quo and being made worse off by actions of the of-
feror. If given her druthers, the recipient in the second two categories
prefers not to have heard of the choice at all. This raises the baseline
issue: What is one’s entitlement not to hear of a choice? In the case of
an offer, the offeree has no right to the boat. In the sale of goods exam-
ple, the buyer is contractually entitled to on time delivery. In the res-
ignation case, although the offeree may not be entitled not to have his
misdeed reported, the threatening party does not threaten to report
because it is the right thing to do. It is merely to weaken the position
of the offeree. Go back to the Odorizzi case in which school officials
threatened to expose Odorizzi’s homosexuality if he did not resign
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). See gen-
erally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Spite: Legal and Social Implications, 22 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 991 (2018).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
59. Bigwood, supra note 54, at 212.
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from his teaching position.60 If that were in fact the right thing to do
in the interest of public welfare, the officials were free to do it. What
they should not be permitted to do is use the threat to achieve some
self-serving end.
In short, threats parties should be entitled not to hear fall into one
of two categories. One is comprised of instances in which a person is
legally or contractually obligated and threatens to violate that duty in
order to coerce the threatened party. The second category is undoubt-
edly more controversial. It involves actions the threatening party may
legally take to increase public welfare. On the other hand, if those
same actions are not taken to benefit others, but rather to advance
self-serving goals while making the threatened party worse off, that
falls inside the area of threats one is entitled not to hear. In a nut-
shell, these two categories include efforts to make oneself better off
only by making another worse off.61
This is not meant to imply that these general guidelines are easy to
apply. Take two extremes. A representative example is Biliouris v.
Biliouris,62 where a divorced wife attempted to show she was under
duress when signing a prenuptial agreement with a man to whom she
was engaged. At the time of the agreement, she was thirty-five years
old, had three children, and was pregnant with the fiance´’s child.63
The agreement was presented to her one week before the marriage.
She signed against the advice of counsel and was crying at the time.64
Evidently, the threat was that the husband would not marry her un-
less the agreement was signed.65 Under the terms of the agreement,
there was to be no alimony, and each party would keep the property
they brought to the marriage.66 Although the court found there was no
duress,67 there should have been. Aside from the fact that the future
spouse was breaching a promise, he was legally permitted to call off
the marriage. However, the threat and its timing were designed to
coerce the future wife. It fits the description of a lawful threat one is
entitled not to hear. He sought to make himself better off only by mak-
ing the other party worse off.
Consider a different example. Sam goes into a store that sells ath-
letic shoes. The store is well lit, there is pleasant music playing, and
60. See supra note 37.
61. Included in this category are spiteful actions in which the only benefit to the
party acting coercively is observing the suffering of the other party. But cf. Sian
E. Provost, A Defense of a Rights-Based Approach to Identifying Coercion in Con-
tract Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 629 (1995).
62. 852 N.E.2d 687 (Mass App. Ct. 2006).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 689.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 690.
67. Id. at 695.
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the salesperson approaches Sam and asks where he got that cool shirt
he is wearing. He then asks Sam if he went to the game on Saturday
and they begin talking about the last-minute touchdown that meant
the home team won. This sales tactic is sometimes referred to as the
salesperson becoming a five-minute friend.68 The salesperson then
shows Sam some shoes that “just came in” and would look great with
the shirt he is wearing. Actually, Sam thinks they would look good too.
But does Sam feel that way because of the characteristics of the shoes
or because his new salesperson friend who Sam now does not want to
disappoint and who will not be his pal if he rejects the shoes? Sam
buys the shoes only to see his “pal” immediately rush off to another
customer and compliment her on her shorts. Sam then decides the
shoes are really not to his liking and wishes he had not bought them.
He feels he was more persuaded by the sales technique than by the
quality of the shoes. In both cases, although it is hard be sympathetic
to Sam, one party is better off only if the “coerced” party is worse off.
In both cases, the undesired alternative is created by the person
doing the persuading and one party is made better off but only by issu-
ing—even implicitly—a threat that will mean the other party will be
or feel worse off. How can we distinguish, as a matter of principle, “I
will not marry you” from “I will no longer be your buddy?” Tort law
provides an easy answer. To some extent, we expect people to be care-
ful and watch out for themselves. In the case of shoe buyer, one senses
that Sam should have known better given the context and the goals of
the salesperson.69 In effect, Sam contributed to the problem. Thus,
even though duress and undue influence should be tortious, they
should be accompanied by something akin to contributory
negligence.70
V. THE SCIENCE
Trespass is typically associated with intrusions on the property of
another. If one accepts that we own our bodies and, thus, our thoughts
and reasoning, then it is a short step to the idea that interfering with
those processes is a form of trespass. This is not an analogy or philo-
sophical possibility. It is physical. Specifically, when a party is sub-
jected to a threat that there is no contractual or legal right to make or
when a person is given a choice that makes another better off at his or
68. A former student who had been a salesperson at a well-known sports shoe outlet
told me this. The strategy was also described by an acquaintance who was a sales
representative at store selling high-end audio equipment.
69. John Dawson notes that in the early development of duress, the threat had to be
strong enough to “overcome a ‘constant’ man.” Dawson, supra note 6, at 255.
70. See generally DOBBS, supra note 29, at 494.
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her expense, the result is to place the person under stress.71 Stress is
one form of discomfort.72 Although we tend to think of stress as a
source of mental discomfort, that feeling is set off by a number of phys-
ical reactions. Just as much as the bruising of a physical blow is an
uncontrollable physical reaction, threats in in the form of duress or
undue influence also result in an uncontrollable physical reaction.
For years scientists have understood the physical impact of
stress.73 There are several overlapping systems that complement each
other in the process of reestablishing homeostasis.74 Initially chemi-
cals are released that have different functions.75 For example,
dopamine helps with decision making and risk assessment.76 Seroto-
nin, on the other hand, serves as a post-stress anxiety reducer.77 This
is only the first step in a chain reaction of effects, all of which “orches-
trate” the body’s effort to adapt to change.78 Along the way, various
parts of the brain become involved, including the amygdala, the
prefrontal cortex, and the hippocampus.79
The negative effects of stress have been well-documented. The sig-
naling from the brain affects nearly every organ.80 Researchers have
also linked stress to diseases including depression, upper respiratory
71. Stress has been defined as “real or anticipated disruption of homeostasis or an
anticipated threat to well-being.” See Yvonne M. Ulrich-Lai & James P. Herman,
Neural Regulation of Endocrine and Autonomic Stress Responses, 10 NATURE
REV. NEUROSCIENCE 397 (2009).
72. Stress can affect decision making but that is not this Article’s focus. See Cathe-
rine A. Hartley & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Anxiety and Decision Making, 72 BIOLOGI-
CAL PSYCHIATRY 113 (2012); Katherine M. Kowalski & Charles Vaught, Judgment
and Decision Making Under Stress: An Overview for Emergency Managers, CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Jan. 1, 2003), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/9731 [https://
perma.unl.edu/YY45-YE35].
73. See, e.g., Francisco Mora et al., Stress, Neurotransmitters, Corticosterone, and
Body-Brain Integration, 1476 BRAIN RES. 71 (2012); See Yvonne M. Ulrich-Lai &
James P. Herman, Neural Regulation of Endocrine and Autonomic Stress Re-
sponses, 10 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 397 (2009); Marian Joe¨ls & Tallie Z.
Baram, The Neuro-symphony of Stress, 10 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 459
(2009).
74. Homeostasis is defined as “the tendency of a system, [especially] the physiological
system of higher animals to maintain internal stability, owing to the coordinated
response of its parts to and situation or stimulus tending to disrupt its normal
condition or function.” WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
(1996).
75. Joe¨ls & Baram, supra note 73.
76. Id. at 460.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 459.
80. See Stress Effects on the Body, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/
helpcenter/stress-body [https://perma.unl.edu/Z97F-EXVD] (last visited July 18,
2019).
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tract infections, herpes viral infections, autoimmune diseases,81 and
cardiovascular problems.82 As one would expect, acute or short-term
stress can be less harmful than chronic stress. Even short-term stress,
however, can affect memory learning,83 digestion, blood sugar,
asthma, and blood pressure,84 and result in negative emotions.85 This
evidence leads us to question why contract law permits, and arguably
encourages, the imposition of stress by those who make threats or un-
duly influence contracting partners.
VI. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
There are few things in law that have not been addressed and the
possibility of making duress and undue influence less attractive is no
exception. One of the most compelling arguments is found in a 1913
treatise, The Law of Quasi Contracts,86 which noted the similarity be-
tween duress and fraud. According to author Frederic Woodward:
[T]here ought to be recognized a universal obligation not to exercise duress
over another to his damage, just as there is not to mislead another to his dam-
age by false representations. For in both cases the duty is essentially the
same—to refrain from injuring another by wrongfully creating a motive for
action. If such were the law, the exercise of duress, like that of fraud . . . would
not give rise to a quasi-contract but would constitute a tort.87
Similarly, a note published by the Harvard Law Review over
ninety years ago makes a truncated case for treating duress as a
tort.88 Again, the author compares duress and fraud:
In duress, as in fraud, the outstanding fact is that the victim’s will has been
coerced by reprehensible means into a consent he would otherwise not have
given or into acts which he would otherwise not have done. The only difference
is as to the method employed by the wrongdoer in effectuating his purpose.89
81. Sheldon Cohen, Denise Janicki-Deverts & Gregory E. Miller, Psychological Stress
and Disease, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1685, 1687 (2007).
82. See, e.g., Joel E. Dimsdale, Psychological Stress and Cardiovascular Disease, 51
J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 1237 (2008); Jean-Christophe Chauvet-Gelinier & Ber-
nard Bonin, Stress, Anxiety and Depression in Heart Disease Patients: A Major
Challenge for Cardiac Rehabilitation, 60 ANNALS PHYSICAL & REHAB. MED. 6
(2017).
83. U.C. Irvine, Short-Term Stress Can Affect Learning and Memory, SCIENCEDAILY
(Mar. 13, 2008), www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/03/080311182434.htm
[https://perma.unl.edu/B5RA-UC4T].
84. Kristen Hicks, The Many Negative Effects of Stress on Health, SENI-
ORADVISOR.COM, https://www.senioradvisor.com/blog/2016/08/the-many-negative-
effects-of-stress-on-health/ [https://perma.unl.edu/KGF8-LEVX] (last visited July
19, 2019).
85. See Pamela J. Feldman et al., Negative Emotion and Acute Physiological Re-
sponses to Stress, 21 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 216 (1999).
86. FREDERIC CAMPBELL WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS (1913).
87. Id. at 336–37.
88. Note, Duress as a Tort, 39 HARV. L. REV. 108 (1925).
89. Id. at 109.
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The proposal in this 1925 note was backed by the reasoning that con-
tract remedies will not always be adequate.90 The current Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts carries forward the example that author
cited. Suppose A is coerced into entering into a contact with B, but the
actual coercion is from C. Under § 175 of the Restatement:
If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by one who is not a party to the
transaction, the contract is voidable by the victim unless the other party to the
transaction in good faith and without reason to know of the duress either
gives value or relies materially on the transaction.91
In short, there is a gap in the law that exists today as it did in 1925. In
the hypothetical, there appears to be no remedy against C based on
contract law. The wrong goes unaddressed unless there is a tort
remedy.
The most compelling case, perhaps only by inference, for treating
duress as a tort was made fifty years ago in an Iowa Law Review note:
The duty which arises . . . is an obligation to exercise superior bargaining
power reasonably. This duty is breached if the stronger party threatens an
action which cannot be justified, under a standard of commercial reasonable-
ness, by the weaker party’s refusal to meet the contractual demand. Cause in
fact depends on a showing that the victim would not have acquiesced . . . if the
wrongful threats had not been issued.92
It is not completely clear, however, whether the author proposes treat-
ing duress as an actual tort or is suggests applying a tort-like analysis
in the context of traditional contract law and the remedies it affords.93
Although not calling for a new tort,94 perhaps the closest to the
proposal found here is a very broad one offered by Australian law pro-
fessor Rick Bigwood. Professor Bigwood coined the phrase “pure ad-
vantage-taking”95 to refer to those instances in which the advantage
taker does not participate in whatever events or activities resulted in
the state of the weaker party.96 He proposes the notion of “transac-
tional neglect,” which would carry with it a duty to take “reasonable
precautions”97 to ensure that a party has been “adequately pro-
tected”98 from external and internal forces. He contrasts this with
cases in which the more powerful party actually causes the imbalance.
He regards those as cases of strict liability.99
90. Id.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
92. Note, supra note 5, at 924. This note included citations to a very limited group of
cases in which duress, in the setting of a contract, was classified as a tort. See id.
at 900-01.
93. For an example of the source of this reader’s confusion, see the concluding com-
ments. Id.
94. Bigwood, supra note 1, at 67.
95. Id. at 65.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 67.
98. Id. at 95.
99. Id. at 66.
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In all of these instances, the analysis focuses on the possibility of
the use of pressure to force a choice the disadvantaged party would
not have otherwise made, as opposed to the harm caused by the threat
itself. As a general matter, the possibility of treating duress as a tort
has received limited commentary100 and this author was unable to
discover any previous writing that applying pressure alone should be
the basis of lability.
VII. THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. Duress
The state of the law with respect to duress as a tort is inconsistent
and confusing. There are, however, a number of cases that seem to
recognize that putting another party under duress can be a tort. On
the other hand, it is difficult to reconcile these cases even when they
are within the same jurisdiction and it would be inaccurate to say
there is a discernable movement toward recognizing either duress or
undue influence as a tort. A number of jurisdictions have rejected or
avoided ruling on whether duress can be a standalone tort.101
A few examples of this uncertainty in Wisconsin, Texas, and New
York are useful. In Wurtz v. Fleischman,102 a 1979 Wisconsin opinion
greatly influenced by the above Iowa Law Review note,103 the court
noted that “economic duress is not only available as a defense to a suit
on a contract, but also may be a separate cause of action or counter-
claim. In such cases, the damages shall be the damages generally
available for intentional torts.”104 In the tort context, duress was iden-
tified as the unreasonable use of superior bargaining power.105 The
100. There are some minor exceptions. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 121 (5th ed. 1984); DOBBS, supra note 29, at 236;
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 328-29 (5th ed. 2003);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch 7 introductory note (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
101. See, e.g., Coyer v. Hemmer, 901 F. Supp. 872, 890-91 (D.N.J. 1995); Williams v.
Boeing Military Aircraft Co., 1991 WL 75571, at *3-4 (D. Kan. 1991); Bennett
Enters. Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza Inc., 794 F. Supp. 434, 438 (citing In re Ashby
Enters., 47 B.R. 394, 398 (D.D.C. 1985), Blake Constr. Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co.,
431 A.2d 569 (D.C. 1981)); Country Corner Food & Drug, Inc. v. First State Bank
& Tr. Co., 966 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Ark. 1998); Cahaba Seafood, Inc. v. Central
Bank, 567 So. 2d 1304, 1306 (Ala. 1990); NN Inv’rs Life Ins. Co. v. Prof’l Grp.,
Inc., 468 So. 2d 532, 533 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Leventhal v. Dockser, 282
N.E.2d 680, 681 (Mass. 1972); Cimarron Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Ins. Co., 848 P.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Okla. 1993).
102. Wurtz v. Fleischman, 278 N.W.2d 266 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979), rev’d, 293 N.W.2d
155 (Wis. 1980).
103. Id. at 269 (citing Note, supra note 5, at 892-96).
104. Wurtz, 278 N.W.2d at 273.
105. Id. at 271.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the case on appeal a year later,106
but the observation that duress could be a tort did not seem the be the
reason for reversal.107 In fact, at least one court noted the case was
reversed on other grounds.108 Federal courts in Wisconsin have taken
a different view. In Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., the court
opined that “absent some clear guidance from the Wisconsin courts . . .
[it would] not conclude that economic duress exists as a stand-alone
tort.”109 The next year it stated in Braeger Chevrolet v. Ally Financial,
Inc. that it was unclear whether the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s re-
versal of Wurtz left intact the “creation of the tortious cause of action
for economic duress.”110
Texas has been more direct in establishing duress as a tort. In
Housing Authority of City of Dallas v. Hubbell, a court explained:
Duress is a tort. It often arises in connection with breach of contract, but it is
nevertheless a tort, and it is not necessary that there should have been privity
of contract between the parties as a prerequisite for such a tort action. One
who sustains damage as a result of being subjected to duress may sue as
plaintiff against the wrongdoer.111
Thus, in Texas, a tort action is also available when the duress is ap-
plied by a third party.112
As in Wisconsin, however, it is not clear that the Texas courts are
consistent with respect to whether duress exists as an independent
tort. In a 1989 Court of Appeals decision, the court observed:
The appellant argues in her brief that duress is a recognizable tort, and she is,
therefore, entitled to recover the damages as awarded by the jury. However,
we need not answer the question of whether duress is an independent, recog-
nizable tort. Even if duress is an independent tort cause of action, and the
106. Wurtz v. Fleischman, 293 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 1980).
107. Reversal seemed to be based on the appellate court’s findings of fact. Id. at 159.
108. See Troutman v. Facetglas, Inc., 316 S.E.2d 424, 426 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
109. Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 650–51 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
The court cited Mancini v. Mathews, 743 N.W.2d 167 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007), a Wis-
consin lower court opinion indicating that duress could not be a stand-alone tort.
Id.
110. Braeger Chevrolet, Inc. v. Ally Fin., Inc., 2015 WL 1523906, at *3 (E.D. Wis.
2015).
111. Housing Auth. v. Hubbell, 325 S.W.2d 880, 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); see also
U.S. v. Hubbell, 323 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1963) (citing the lower court opinion in
subsequent interpleader action); King Constr. Co. v. W.M. Smith Elec. Co., 350
S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (recognizing duress as a tort); Leal v. Bank
of America, 2012 WL 1392089, at *5 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (reiterating that Texas
courts have recognized duress as an independent cause of action). But see Kinsel
v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 411 n.3 (Tex. 2017) (a more recent decision holding
that undue influence, which is closely related to duress, cannot be the basis of a
tort action); NN Inv’rs Life Ins. v. Prof’l Grp., 468 So. 2d 532, 533 n.1 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting the idea of duress as a tort, the court observed that
Hubbell, “[t]he Texas case first recognizing the tort .  .  . contains no reasoning
and, of course, relies on no decided cases.”).
112. See King v. Bishop, 879 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. App. 1994).
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appellant was entitled to recover on these facts, we find that she failed to
properly plead duress as a cause of action.113
On the other hand, a more recent Fifth Circuit opinion stated:
This Court has held that under Texas law the tort of economic duress exists
only if the following factors are shown: (1) there is a threat to do something
which a party threatening has no legal right to do; (2) there is some illegal
exaction or some fraud or deception; and (3) the restraint is imminent and
such as to destroy free agency without present means of protection.114
This version of duress as a tort seems to deviate from a pure notion of
duress as a tort in that it requires an “illegal exaction, or some fraud,
or deception.”115 In fact, the same court observed that “few Texas
cases have awarded recovery on this ‘tort.’ ”116 Nevertheless, Texas
courts have sporadically viewed duress as a tort.
New York has a similar pattern of inconsistency. A 1990 case,
Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. D’Evori Int’l Inc., explained, “We do not
believe that the doctrine of economic duress, which is traditionally
used as a defense to an action, has any place in a cause of action seek-
ing money damages.”117 This accords with a 1993 case, Nice v. Com-
bustion Engineering, Inc., which noted, “There is no substantive cause
of action for duress and undue influence.”118 These cases seem incon-
sistent with a 1985 case that suggested duress is a cause of action
“known to the law.”119 Similarly, in Ippisch v. Moricz-Smith in 1955, a
New York court found that “[a] threat of unlawful conduct intended to
prevent and which does prevent another from exercising free will and
judgment[ ] falls within the definition of duress,” citing the Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts.120 In an even earlier New York case, 30 East
End Inc. v. World Steel Products,121 the court held that “duress, analo-
gous to deceit, may be brought as a tort action.”122
Similarly, New Mexico has noted that duress can be a tort123 but
has more recently expressed ambivalence, reasoning in one case:
113. Campbell v. McCrory Corp., 1989 WL 28390, at *2 (Tex. App. 1989). A different
view is taken by other Texas courts. See Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd.,
696 S.W.2d 468, 472-73 (Tex. App. 1985); State Nat’l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co. 678
S.W.2d 661, 682 (Tex. App. 1984).
114. Lee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 34 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Beijing Metal & Minerals v. Am. Bus. Ctr., 993 F.2d 1178,
1184-85 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also In re Artho, 587 B.R. 866, 883 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2018) (reiterating the elements of the tort of economic duress under Texas law).
115. Lee, 34 F.3d at 288.
116. Lee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 943 F.2d 554, 560 n.11 (5th Cir. 1991).
117. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. v. D’Evori Int’l, Inc., 163 A.D.2d 26, 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
118. Nice v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 193 A.D.2d 1088, 1089 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
119. Ressis v. Mactye, 108 A.D.2d 960, 961 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
120. Ippisch v. Moricz-Smith, 144 N.Y.S.2d 505, 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
121. 30 East End, Inc. v. World Steel Prods. Corp., 110 N.Y.S.2d 754 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1952).
122. Id. at 758.
123. Terrel v. Duke City Lumber Co., 524 P.2d 1021, 1040 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).
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“There are circumstances in which a claim of economic duress has
been analyzed as a tort . . . although, in its traditional sense, duress is
not in and of itself a recognized tort.”124 Yet, another case states: “The
torts of economic duress and interferences with contractual relations
have their own potential to interfere with freedom of contract. But
they were recognized in response to inappropriate behavior in the eco-
nomic realm.”125
Other instances in which duress has been treated a tort tend to be
more isolated.126 For example, in the 1946 case Furman v. Gulf Insur-
ance Co.,127 the plaintiff sold his insurance agency to a third party
after insurance companies to which he was indebted threatened to
take over his business.128 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing
the Restatement of Torts129 and interpreting Missouri law, opined
that “[t]he obtaining of the transfer of any form of property by duress
is now recognized as tortious.”130 Similarly, it has been argued that in
California, the tort of duress exists when one compels another to pay
money to avoid the wrongful threat of a civil action.131
B. Undue Influence
Although courts have nibbled around the edges of the rule that du-
ress is generally not a tort, the same cannot be said of undue influ-
ence. In the 2014 edition of Contracts, Professor Perillo noted that
“[we] know of no case in which undue influence has been deemed to
constitute a tort.”132 This is consistent with Dan Dobbs’ statement
that “there is no tort of undue influence.”133 Similarly the Restate-
124. First Nat’l Bank v. Sanchez, 815 P.2d 613, 616 (N.M. 1991) (citing DAN B. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 10.2 (1973)).
125. Beaudry v. Farmers Ins. Exch. Farmers Grp., Inc., 388 P.3d 662, 686 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2016), rev’d, 412 P.3d 1100 (2018). The West Virginia Supreme Court has
also expressed some receptivity to the tort of duress. Mach. Hauling, Inc. v. Steel
of W. Va., 384 S.E.2d 139, 143 (W. Va. 1989).
126. For example, a Georgia court refers to “the tort of duress” evidently linking du-
ress to a version of fraud. Edwards v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 298 S.E.2d 600,
602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); see also Peavy v. Bank South, 474 S.E.2d 690, 693 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1996) (discussing tortious duress as applied in situations involving
threatened criminal prosecution).
127. Furman v. Gulf Ins. Co., 152 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1946).
128. Id. at 892–93.
129. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 871 (1939).
130. Furman, 152 F.2d at 894.
131. Fuhrman v. Cal. Satellite Sys., 179 Cal. App. 3d 408, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
However, the California Supreme Court case relied on for the proposition, while
labeling duress as a form of fraud, seems to limit recovery to money paid while
under duress as opposed to traditional tort damages. Leeper v. Beltrami, 347
P.2d 12, 16 (Cal. 1959).
132. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 304 (7th ed. 2014). The “we” refers to former co-
author John D. Calamari. Id.
133. DOBBS, supra note 5, at 658.
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ment (Second) of Contracts points out that “duress and undue influ-
ence . . . are not generally of themselves actionable torts.”134 This
author conducted further research using Westlaw in the summer of
2019, entering the search term “ ‘undue influence’ /10 & contracts.”
Using this term yielded no contract cases in which a plaintiff using an
undue influence rationale successfully invoked a tort theory for
recovery.135
VIII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND PROBLEM AREAS
This Article proposes that those who place others under duress or
apply undue influence resulting in avoidable contracts be liable in
tort.136 The ability to avoid the contract is a bright line test of whether
a duty has been violated. The principal support for this position is the
ambivalence found in contract law in cases of duress and undue influ-
ence. Contract law allows contracts made under these conditions to be
voidable but provides no motivation for advantage takers not to repeat
their actions. In fact, the incentives are the opposite.
This Article is, hopefully, a preliminary step in exploring this pos-
sibility. Like any new idea, the proposal would benefit from refine-
ment. There are problem areas, none of which should block an effort to
advance a policy of discouraging active advantage-taking. One area
that can be dealt with fairly simply is when a party is liable. The in-
tersection of contract law and tort law provides guidance. Contract
law allows parties who are the victims of undue influence or duress to
avoid the contract. The suggestion here is to put some teeth into that
outcome by adding that the person who has applied the undue influ-
ence or duress has committed a tort.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch 7 introductory note (AM. LAW INST.
1981). Interestingly, this introductory note is followed by, “But see Comment f to
Restatement, Torts § 871,” which states,
If the plaintiff seeks damages in a tort action, the cases do not yet show a
similar expansion of the concept of duress. When the question is one of
invalidation of the consent for the purpose of permitting a tort action
upon the basis that the consent is no consent, the remedy has thus far
been granted only in cases involving use or threat of force against the
person consenting or the members of his immediate family or his valua-
ble property.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 871 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
135. Courts have at least considered making duress a tort even though few do. Undue
influence is a different matter. Why is there a difference? The answer possibly
lies in the fact that duress requires finding an actual threat, meaning that the
risk of error, in terms of allowing opportunistic avoidance, is lower. Undue influ-
ence, on the other hand, requires a vaguer examination of whether someone’s free
will is thwarted. The risk of error, in terms of allowing opportunistic behavior, is
higher.
136. Contract law itself would be the preferable route but seems to adhere to a hard
rule prohibiting punitive damages.
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One issue concerns those who resist duress or undue influence and
enter into a contract that is voidable but which they prefer not to
avoid. This Article makes the point that harm is still done in these
instances. Should the party who is satisfied with the bargain, but not
the process of arriving at the outcome, be permitted to recover? No
doubt this would strike many as an odd outcome. Recovery would,
however, be consistent with the policy of discouraging active advan-
tage-taking. On balance, it is probably best not to allow those who do
not wish to avoid their contracts to recover. There are two reasons for
this. First, this practice creates the moral hazard of claims by people
who actually felt little or no discomfort but who are ultimately happy
to clog the courts with questionable claims. More importantly, it is not
necessary. Punitive damages awarded to those who do avoid avoidable
contracts should provide a sufficient level of deterrence for all those
inclined to overstep what are acceptable methods of persuasion.
This leaves the issue of damages. In contract law, the general rem-
edy is to allow avoidance of the contract and restitution. Actual dam-
ages are unavailable in part because there is no breach of contract.
This, as argued in this Article, leaves a tort remedy for compensatory
and, more importantly, punitive damages. Proof of compulsion suffi-
cient to allow avoidance should be enough to establish actual harm.
This is a different matter from putting a dollar value on that harm.
That may be impossible to establish but does not rule out an award of
nominal damages as a way to award punitive damages sufficient for a
deterrent effect.
